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Abstract The introduction of independent retailers has long been recognized
as a buffer that alleviates the price competition between channels. In this
paper, we argue that this effect may be counter-balanced if the manufacturers
compete along dimensions that differ from prices (such as advertising). We
find that delegating to retailers may intensify other non-price competition
between the manufacturers and therefore make the manufacturers worse off.
Our analysis shows that the “retailer buffer” may be a two-edged sword and
thus suggests that channel structure may critically depend on the specific
dimensions along which the manufacturers compete with each other.
Keywords Distribution channel · Competition · Advertising · Game theory
1 Introduction
A central issue in the marketing literature is the selection of channel structure.
At least dating back to Spengler (1950), there has been a vast discussion on the
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comparison between the “direct channel,” in which a manufacturer sells the
products directly to end consumers, and the “indirect channel,” in which
the manufacturer delegates the sales responsibility to the retailer. Spengler
(1950) demonstrates that delegation may lead to “a cascade of monopolies”:
Since both the manufacturer and the retailer intend to mark up the prices to
claim their profits, the retail price is driven upwards away from the socially
efficient level and ultimately hurts the entire channel. Consequently, vertical
integration may be more favorable than delegation. This is the celebrated
“double marginalization” problem.
A remarkable observation made by McGuire and Staelin (1983) is that
such preference over channel structure may be reversed if the manufacturer–
retailer dyad is confronted with competition from other channels. They demon-
strate that, when two channels engage in price competition in the consumer
market, delegating to (independent) retailers may relax the price competition.
This “retailer buf fer” may be beneficial for the manufacturers if the products
are highly substitutable, i.e., if the competition is intense; as a result, it
increases manufacturers’ profits even when the channel is not coordinated.
McGuire and Staelin (1983) also identify a number of examples with this pre-
dicted industry structure, namely, fast food chains, automobiles, gasolines, soft
drinks, industrial gases, fork lift trucks, heavy farm equipment, and numerous
wholesalers that distribute through retail outlets. Since then, its robustness has
been elaborated by a number of researchers, including Bonanno and Vickers
(1988), Coughlan (1985), Gupta and Loulou (1998), Rey and Stiglitz (1995),
and Trivedi (1998), among others.
Despite its widely accepted position, we note that the aforementioned
papers focus exclusively on the price competition, whereas in practice most
manufacturers are engaged in other forms of competition, e.g., advertising,
product/service quality, and R&D expenditure (DeGraba 1987; Vilcassim et al.
1999). Among them, the most notable form of competition is advertising due
to its large impact in various industries. Numerous advertisements by Miller
and Coors are running on a daily basis in all sports programs (such as Super
Bowl, NBA playoffs, and Wimbledon Championships) in major TV channels,
e.g., ABC, ESPN, and TNT. In 2003, $3.32 billion was spent by Procter and
Gamble to advertise its detergents and cosmetics in the nationwide media such
as magazines and television channels, and Pfizer devoted $2.84 billion to the
advertisement of its drugs (see Bagwell 2007). R.J. Reynolds spent between
$25 and $50 million on advertising and marketing their newly introduced
Camel No. 9 cigarettes in numerous women’s magazines such as Glamour,
Cosmopolitan, and Vogue. The purpose of advertising these products is appar-
ently to compete against other manufacturers in the same categories.1 These
1For example, Procter and Gamble competes against Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer’s drug market is
also exposed to Bayer and Merck & Co., and R.J. Reynolds’s main competitors are the tobacco
companies Virginia Slims Capri and Misty.
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impacts are not only prevalent but also growing: According to the report by
World Advertising Research Center, the advertising expenditure is expected
to increase by 33% to 52% over the next decade, despite the current economic
recession and downturns of other business aspects.2
Built upon these observations, this paper attempts to address the following
research question: In the presence of non-price competition, does delegating to
retailers remain benef icial for the manufacturers? To this end, we consider a
model with two manufacturers, two dedicated retailers, and three groups of
consumers with heterogeneous preferences. Among the consumers, there are
a group of switchers that are highly price-sensitive, and two less price-sensitive
loyal segments that prefer to purchase from one manufacturer rather than the
other. The manufacturers produce horizontally differentiated products, and
are confronted with an economic tradeoff: (1) each manufacturer can integrate
the (downstream) retailer to bypass the double marginalization problem,
which we label as the “direct channel” scenario; (2) the manufacturers could
rather delegate to the retailers to escape from the intense price competition;
this is labeled as the “indirect channel” scenario. To examine how the channel
structure affects the competition of different forms, we assume that each
manufacturer can choose to spend a lump sum advertising expense to increase
consumers’ gross valuation (reservation price) for its own product.3
We find that, in the indirect channel, it may be beneficial for a manufacturer
to advertise if the rival chooses not to do so; moreover, the manufacturer
suffers from a significant loss if it does not advertise but the rival does. The
intuition is as follows. When the manufacturers delegate to the independent re-
tailers, the resulting retail prices tend to be set high (due to the aforementioned
double marginalization problem); this, in turn, dissuades some loyal consumers
from purchasing any product. In this case, it is profitable for the manufacturer
to advertise, for it shifts upwards the consumers’ preferences and allows the
manufacturer to capture more loyal consumers. However, we also observe
that, in certain conditions, advertising may make both manufacturers worse
off. Collectively, the availability of advertising may drag the manufacturers
into the trap of “prisoners’ dilemma”: advertising appears to be an individually
2See http://www.creativematch.co.uk/viewnews/?90183 and AA’s Quarterly Survey of Advertising
Expenditure at http://www.adassoc.org.uk/.
3Note that we do not model the channel structure decisions to be an explicit function of advertising
and pricing decisions for two reasons. First, the selection of channel structure is relatively a long-
term decision for the manufacturers for their selling business, whereas the advertising and pricing
strategies can be tailored for a specific product. Thus, it seems more appropriate to assume that,
while the manufacturers decide the advertising and pricing strategies, the channel structure has
been pre-determined. Second, as we investigate the manufacturers’ competition, it is not clear how
the two competing manufacturers can jointly select a channel structure. This conceptual problem
is particularly challenging when the manufacturers are competitors and no coordination scheme is
available.
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dominant strategy, but both manufacturers may be better off if they could
commit not to advertise. On the contrary, if the manufacturers sell directly to
the consumers, they may stop the temptation of making wasteful advertising.
Our results demonstrate that competition along dimensions other than
prices may alter the manufacturers’ preference over channel structures. In
the concluding section, we discuss some empirical evidence that validates our
predictions. Specifically, these include the fast food chains and the automobile
industry, two important examples mentioned in McGuire and Staelin (1983),
for which the advertising expenditures are empirically shown to be higher in
the indirect channel than in the direct channel. Naturally, our specific choice
of advertising is only one form of non-price competition. Our results are, how-
ever, not necessarily limited to this specific form of competition. Potentially,
all our results could hold qualitatively when the manufacturers’ strategies
affect directly the consumers’ valuation regarding the product/ service, thereby
leading to the belief that the manufacturers may prefer the direct channels
occasionally if the nature of competition is complicated/multi-dimensional.
Our paper contributes to the vast literature on channel management.
The majority of the extant literature suggests that dedicated intermediaries
(retailers) can mitigate price competition among manufacturers following
McGuire and Staelin (1983). Coughlan (1985) generalizes the demand function
to validate the robustness of the result in McGuire and Staelin (1983). Gupta
and Loulou (1998) find that the conclusion of McGuire and Staelin (1983) is
not prone to the presence of vertical externality of a manufacturer’s effort
reduction in process innovation. Rey and Stiglitz (1995) show that exclusive
territories can serve as a device to reduce competition among manufacturers.
They further show that intermediaries may be employed when the channel
competition is intense. There are other papers that evaluate the connection
between price competition, channel structure, and the strategic interactions
between upstream manufacturers and the downstream retailers, see, e.g.,
Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Chen et al. (2009), Fay (2009), Trivedi (1998),
Wang et al. (2009), and Wu and Wang (2005). In line with this research, we
incorporate advertising competition and, thus, offer further insights into the
strategic effects of adopting different channel structures.
Since we investigate the strategic role of channel structure with the presence
of advertising competition, our paper is connected to the literature on adver-
tising strategies. Unlike our paper, most of the established work is confined
within the direct channel framework, including Dixit and Norman (1978),
Meurer and Stahl (1994), Parker and Kim (1999), Singh et al. (1998), Soberman
(2004), Stegeman (1991), and von der Fehr and Stevik (1998). The advertising
strategies in the common retailer channel settings have been investigated in
Shaffer and Zettelmeyer (2002, 2004, 2009), and Sethuraman and Tellis (2002).
Shaffer and Zettelmeyer (2002, 2004, 2009) investigate the benefit of using
targeted advertising to create product differentiation. In contrast, we allow
the channel competition and focus on how different channel structures affect
the nature of the competition. The possibility of excessive competition from
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persuasive advertising is also investigated by some researchers. For example,
Alemson (1970), Kelton and Kelton (1982), and Tremblay and Tremblay
(2005) report that, if a manufacturer increases its expenditure on advertising,
its rival manufacturer(s) may increase their expenditure on advertising, as well
as a counteraction; this could lead to wasteful advertising expenses due to the
reciprocal cancellation. In stark contrast with the aforementioned papers, we
show that this reciprocal cancellation need not arise if the channel structure is
taken into consideration.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows: In Section 2, we
discuss our basic model characteristics, including the consumer preferences,
the channel structure, and the manufacturers and retailers’ objective and
decisions. Section 3 examines how the advertising competition affects the
equilibrium channel structure. In Section 4, we offer some concluding remarks
and empirical evidence that supports our analytical predictions. All the proofs
are in the Appendix.
2 The model
In our model, there are two manufacturers, two dedicated retailers, and three
groups of consumers with heterogeneous preferences and single-unit demand.
To model the consumers’ heterogeneous preferences, we adopt the Hotelling
models with a line segment structure over [0,1] (Hotelling 1929) for each group.
The two manufacturers, labeled as M1 and M2, are symmetric and located at
the endpoints of this line segment: 0 for M1 and 1 for M2. We denote product
1(2) as the product produced by manufacturer M1(M2). The production cost of
each manufacturer is assumed to be constant and normalized to zero without
loss of generality.
The Hotelling model allows us to classify the consumers into three groups:
switchers, the loyal segment of M1, and the loyal segment of M2, which we
describe in detail below. The preference of a switcher is modeled as an ideal
point, denoted by x that lies within the Hotelling line [0, 1], and switchers
uniformly reside in the interval [0, 1] with normalized unit density 1. Each
switcher obtains a common valuation V from either product 1 or 2 and
incurs a transportation cost with a common transportation parameter t. This
transportation cost captures the negative utility arising from the discrepancy
between her ideal point x and the product position, and the transportation
parameter measures her price sensitivity.
In addition to the switchers, there are two groups of loyal consumers
that belong to the turfs of the two manufacturers, respectively. Compared
to the switchers, these loyal consumers are less price-sensitive with a higher
transportation parameter γ t, where γ > 1. The loyal consumers for M1 are
uniformly located along the same preference space in the interval [0, 1] with
density β, and those for M2 reside uniformly similarly on [0, 1] with density β
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as well. We assume that a loyal consumer obtains a valuation V upon obtaining
one unit of her favorable brand, and valuation 0 upon the other brand. We use
x1 and x2 to denote the preference of a consumer loyal to manufacturers 1 and
2 in the corresponding Hotelling line [0, 1]. These three separate Hotelling
lines allow us to explicitly formulate the consumer behaviors within different
groups.
From the above description, the turf of a manufacturer is composed of a
group of consumers that are exclusively loyal to their favorite manufacturer,
and are also heterogeneous with regard to the tolerance specified by their
ideal points. Similar to the discrete model with a group of homogeneous
loyal consumers (e.g., Agrawal 1996), these loyal consumers are in strong
favor of their favorite manufacturer. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity among
loyal consumers in a manufacturer’s turf leads to an ef fective demand curve
a manufacturer faces in its own turf in response to the pricing decision. This
is arguably a more practical situation than the typical discrete setting, since it
allows us to capture the heterogeneity among loyal consumers and endogenize
their purchasing behavior with a micro-foundation. As we elaborate later, this
demand curve turns out to be crucial for driving most of our results.
Given the model architecture, if a switcher is located at x ∈ [0, 1], her






V − p1 − tx, if purchasing product 1
V − p2 − t(1 − x), if purchasing product 2
0, otherwise
,
where p1 and p2 denote the prices for products 1 and 2, respectively. For a loyal
consumer located at x1 ∈ [0, 1] (in M1’s turf), her utility can be expressed as:
Ux1 =
{
V − p1 − γ tx1, if purchasing product 1
0, otherwise
.
Likewise, a loyal consumer for M2 with ideal point x2 ∈ [0, 1] obtains a utility:
Ux2 =
{
V − p2 − γ t(1 − x2), if purchasing product 2
0, otherwise
.
Each consumer rationally makes her purchase decision to maximize her utility.
In the presence of dedicated retailers, the manufacturers are confronted
with an economic tradeoff: (1) Each manufacturer can integrate the (down-
stream) retailer to bypass the double marginalization problem; it is conceivable
that, upon integration, the manufacturers are able to drive the retail price down
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towards the “monopoly” level; consequently, it may allow the manufacturer
to extract a higher revenue from its loyal consumers. (2) The manufacturers
could rather delegate to the retailers; in this scenario, the “buffer” created by
the retailers’ mark-up may prevent these two channels from the intense price
competition in the consumer market (McGuire and Staelin 1983). Following
McGuire and Staelin (1983), we adopt the wholesale price contract in the
manufacturer–retailer transactions. We label scenario 1 as the “direct channel”
and scenario 2 as the “indirect channel .” A primary goal of our paper is to
compare these two channel structures and investigate how the presence of
loyal consumers affects the manufacturers’ decisions.
To examine the impact of advertising competition, we assume that each
manufacturer now is able to decide whether to spend a fixed expense C to
advertise. If an advertising strategy is adopted by a manufacturer, consumers’
gross valuation for purchasing its product is increased by a constant  > 0
that is independent of the consumers’ ideal points.4 To simplify our analysis,
we shall focus on the situation in which the preference shift is reasonably
small/bounded above (the exact requirements will be given in the analysis).
The sequence of events is as follows. In the direct channel scenario, both
manufacturers simultaneously decide whether to advertise in the first period,
and then simultaneously set prices for consumers in the second period. In the
indirect channel scenario, both manufacturers simultaneously decide whether
to advertise in the first period, and then the manufacturers’ advertising strate-
gies are made public; next, the manufacturers set the wholesale prices for their
dedicated retailers in the second period; subsequently, retailers simultaneously
determine the retail prices to sell to the consumers. Since the game involves
multiple rounds of strategic interaction, we adopt subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium as our solution concept. In the next section, we evaluate how the
advertising competition affects the manufacturers’ strategies and the channel
structure.
3 The impact of advertising competition
In the sequel, we first characterize the equilibrium behavior of the manu-
facturers in the direct channel, and then derive the equilibrium behavior in
the manufacturer–retail dyads in the indirect channel scenario. In the end,
we compare these two scenarios to see the interaction between the channel
4In principle, we could allow the advertising expense and the valuation increase to depend on
each other, i.e., C = C(). This flexible advertising cost may allow us to determine the optimal
advertising expenditure in the competitive environment. However, since our primary goal is to
demonstrate that the retailer buffer may amplify the advertising competition, such an extension
does not alter our conclusions.
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structure and the advertising strategies. Furthermore, to facilitate our analysis
and to rule out trivial cases, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1
t (γ + 2β + 1) < V < γ t
(
24β2 + 64β3 + 24γβ + 72γβ2 + 4γ 2 + 18γ 2β + γ 3)
(γ + 2β) (γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2) ,
and  is small.5
Assumption 1 implies that, in the direct channel, the consumers in the turfs
will be induced to purchase the products, whereas in the indirect channel, some
consumers in the turfs intend not to purchase in equilibrium. Furthermore, in
order to focus on the effect of advertising competition, we restrict the size of
the turfs within a reasonable range, i.e., β < 1.
3.1 Direct channel
In the direct channel, both manufacturers sell their products directly to final
consumers. We analyze the equilibrium behavior in two stages. By backward
induction, we first derive the equilibrium pricing strategies for any given ad-
vertising strategy profile; after this, we return to the first stage—the advertising
competition game.
The detailed derivations of equilibrium pricing strategies are provided in
the Appendix. Based on these pricing strategies, we are able to obtain the
equilibrium payoffs for the manufacturers under each scenario of advertising
strategies. These serve as the inputs to the first-stage advertising game, which
is summarized in the following normal-form game, where the subscript denotes
the manufacturer’s index and the superscript D indicates the “direct channel.”





1 − 2Vβ − γ t + Vγ
γ t (γ + 4β) +
(γ + 2β (3γ + 4β) (2Vβ + γ t))
γ t (γ + 4β) (γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)
]
×
t (γ + 4β (3γ + 4β))
(
γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2
) (
3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2
)
4 (γ + 2β) (γ 2 + 6γβ + 6β2) (γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2) ,
2 =
γ t (γ + 4β)
(
γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2
)
+ (γ + 2β) (3γ + 4β) (2Vβ + γ t) − (γ V + 2Vβ − γ t)
(
γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2
)
(γ + 2β) (γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2) .
Please see the Appendix for details.
Mark Lett (2011) 22:79–99 87
Table 1 The advertising
game in the direct channel
context
M2 N (do not advertise) A (advertise)
M1
N π D1 (N, N), π
D
2 (N, N) π
D
1 (N, A), π
D
2 (N, A)
A π D1 (A, N), π
D
2 (A, N) π
D




π D1 (N, N) = π D2 (N, N) =
t
2
(1 + 2β)2 ,
















π D1 (A, A) = π D2 (A, A) =
t
2
(1 + 2β)2 − C.
Based on Table 1, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 In the direct channel, no advertising is the dominant strategy
for a manufacturer if C ≥ F D1 , where F D1 = (1+2β)3 + 
2
18t ; in this case, each
manufacturer earns a prof it t2 (1 + 2β)2.
Proposition 1 is intended to convey the following messages. When the
manufacturers are privileged with loyal consumers, as indicated by the in-
equality C ≥ F D1 , advertising is not favorable if either (1) the size of loyal
consumers is too small, (2) the preference shift is not significant, or (3) the
“transportation cost” of consumers for purchasing a product away from their
ideal points is moderate. These results can be explained as follows. The
advertising serves two purposes for the manufacturer: (1) to enhance the
loyalty within its turf; (2) to gain a more advantageous position in competing
for the switchers vis-à-vis the rival manufacturer. As there are not many
loyal consumers, the first effect is less crucial. The consequence of preference
shift is also straightforward: the more effective the advertising is in altering
consumers’ preferences, the higher incentive a manufacturer has to advertise.
Perhaps less intuitively, the manufacturers are unwilling to advertise when
the consumers are highly hesitant to purchase products positioned away from
their ideal points (for a large t). All else being equal, when consumers incur
a higher cost in purchasing a product that does not fit their preferences
well, advertising is not favorable for two reasons. First, the manufacturer can
seize its loyal consumers easily without making advertising. Second, even if
it advertises, it attracts relatively fewer new switchers. Having obtained the
6Note that, under Assumption 1, all consumers in the turfs are served in equilibrium under the
direct channel.
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Table 2 The advertising
game in the indirect channel
context
M2 N (do not advertise) A (advertise)
M1
N π I1 (N, N), π
I
2 (N, N) π
I
1 (N, A), π
I
2 (N, A)
A π I1 (A, N), π
I
2 (A, N) π
I
1 (A, A), π
I
2 (A, A)
manufacturers’ equilibrium behavior in the direct channel, we next turn to the
indirect channel.
3.2 Indirect channel
In the indirect channel, the game is analyzed in three stages. We first derive
the equilibrium retail prices set by the retailers for any given wholesale price
profile and advertising strategies of the manufacturers; after that, we derive
the manufacturers’ optimal decisions on wholesale prices; finally, we return to
the first-stage advertising game between the manufacturers. While details are
relegated to the Appendix, we present the conceptual normal-form advertising
game in Table 2 below, where the subscript denotes the manufacturer’s
index and the superscript I indicates the “indirect channel”; the closed-form
expressions of the profits are characterized in the Appendix.
The results of this advertising game is summarized below.
Proposition 2 In the indirect channel, there exist thresholds F I2 and F
I
3 with
F I3 < F
I
2 such that (1) advertising is the dominant strategy for a manufacturer if
C < F I2 ; 2) If F
I
3 < C < F
I
2 , advertising is the manufacturers’ dominant strategy
but both manufacturers would be better of f had they not advertised.7
Proposition 2 depicts that when advertising is not too costly, it is beneficial
for a manufacturer to advertise if the rival chooses not to do so; moreover,
the manufacturer suffers from a significant loss if it does not advertise but
the rival does. The intuition is as follows. When the manufacturers delegate
to the independent retailers, the resulting retail prices tend to be set high
(due to the double marginalization problem); this in turn dissuades some loyal
consumers from purchasing any product. In such a scenario, it is profitable for
the manufacturer to advertise, for it shifts upwards the consumers’ preferences
and allows the manufacturer to capture more loyal consumers or “cover” its
entire turf. The exact expressions of these thresholds to sustain a dominant
strategy are given in the Appendix.
However, we also observe that, in certain conditions, advertising may make
both manufacturers worse off. Collectively, the availability of advertising may
drag the manufacturers into the trap of “prisoners’ dilemma”: advertising
7Note that we focus on the situation in which the profit in the direct channel is smaller than that in
the indirect channel when V > V6; moreover, Propositions 1 and 2 can be sustained simultaneously
if V > V7, where the values V6 and V7 are derived in the Appendix.
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appears to be an individually dominant strategy, but both manufacturers may
be better off if they could commit not to advertise. The rationale for this pris-
oners’ dilemma follows from the manufacturer’s incentive to attract more loyal
consumers and switchers. Nevertheless, when both manufacturers advertise,
the increased valuations are cancelled out for the switchers; consequently, each
manufacturer only benefits from selling to more loyal consumers. This may be
outweighed by the advertising expenditure, and therefore, a net loss results.
3.3 Channel comparison
Let us now compare the direct and indirect channels and state our main result.
Proposition 3 It is possible that the manufacturers do not advertise in the direct
channel but both advertise in the indirect channel; moreover, the manufacturers
obtain lower prof its under the indirect channel than under the direct channel.
Proposition 3 implies that delegation to retailers may drag the manufac-
turers into a prisoners’ dilemma, thereby making both manufacturers worse
off. Specifically, we find that F D1 ≤ F I3 can hold within an appropriate range
of V, in which case the manufacturers do not advertise in the direct channel
but advertise in the indirect channel.8 The rationale follows closely the double
marginalization problem, as we have elaborated after Proposition 2. Past
literature has established that delegation allows the manufacturers to escape
from the intense price competition. Our results echo this conventional wisdom;
in addition, we identify a previously ignored effect: delegation could also lead
to an intense advertising competition that would otherwise be avoided in the
direct channel. We thus conclude that competition along dimensions other than
prices (such as advertising) may induce the manufacturers to select the direct
channel over the indirect channel.
We have also worked out a numerical example to validate our analytical
results on the channel comparison. In our example, we adopt the following
parameter combinations: γ = 2, V = 5.9t,  = 0.1t, β = 0.8, and C = 0.12t.
With these parameters, if advertising is not available and the manufacturers
therefore engage only in price competition, we find that, in the direct channel,
each manufacturer obtains 16950 t in equilibrium, whereas, in the indirect channel,




. However, when advertising
is an available option, the equilibrium profit of each manufacturer is higher









the preference of channel structure may get reversed when advertising is
introduced.
8This can be sustained if
C >
(γ + 2β) (3γ + 4β) (γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2) [γ t + 2β (V + )]2
2γ t (γ + 4β) (γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)2
− t
2
(1 + 2β)2 ,
and V8 < V < V9, where V8 and V9 are given in the Appendix.
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4 Discussions and conclusions
In this paper, we show that delegating to retailers may induce the manu-
facturers to advertise and make both manufacturers worse off. This suggests
that channel structure may critically depend on the specific dimensions along
which the manufacturers compete with each other. Following McGuire and
Staelin (1983), numerous researchers have reexamined the buffer effect of
introducing independent retailers in various settings. Our analysis shows that
the “retailer buffer” may be a two-edged sword and, thus, suggests that channel
structure may critically depend on the specific dimensions along which the
manufacturers compete with each other. Since we aim at pointing out the
previously ignored effects of the retailer buffers, all our analysis is confined
within the two scenarios for given channel structures. The equilibrium/ optimal
channel structure (from the manufacturers’ perspective) is left unaddressed
and is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that if one
were to characterize the equilibrium channel structure, the effects identified
in our paper should play a significant role. In the following, we report some
empirical evidence that validates our results and lays out possible extensions.
We are aware of two recent empirical studies that rigorously investigate
the interdependence between channel structures and advertising expenditures.
Srinivasan (2006) uses panel data of U.S. restaurant chains for the period 1992–
2002. Srinivasan (2006) uses the proportion of the restaurant chain’s franchised
units to the total number of its system units to measure the degree of integra-
tion. Specifically, this proxy is a continuous variable in [0,1], where 0 indicates
a completely vertically integrated channel and 1 corresponds to a completely
decentralized (franchised) channel. He finds a statistically and economically
significant relation between the channel structure and advertising expenditure.
When a firm’s operation is closer to a vertically integrated channel, it spends
less in advertising, whereas a firm that primarily franchises to independent
retailers tends to allocate more resource in the advertisement.
The second related empirical paper is Arruñada and Vázquez (2007), where
they estimate the relative performance between firms with different organiza-
tional choices in a sample of 250 Spanish car distributors. In these car distribu-
tors, 179 of them are independent from the manufacturers and 71 distributors
are company-owned (i.e., they correspond to the direct channel in our context).
The panel data come from the financial statements for the 1994 financial
year. Arruñada and Vázquez (2007) use the advertising effort/expenditure as
a proxy for the importance of manufacturer’s effort (more precisely, it is “the
percentage of sales spent on advertising by each manufacturer”). Interestingly,
Arruñada and Vázquez (2007) first conjectured that vertical integration should
lead to a higher advertising effort, a contradiction to our prediction, and then
found that this hypothesis is firmly rejected by their empirical analysis.
Our analysis can be extended in a number of ways. In this paper, we restrict
our attention to the wholesale price contract in the manufacturer-retailer
relationship. In practice, there are various forms of contracts that are widely
used to coordinate the channels, including quantity discount, returns, rebates,
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and quantity flexibility contracts. It would be interesting to study whether
and how the choice of channel structure are affected by other contract forms.
Another direction may be to extend our results to a more general/complicated
supply chain network. For example, a real supply chain may involve multiple
manufacturers with a nexus of common and dedicated retailers, a manufac-
turer may sell through multiple channels, and the retailers may own private
labels that compete with the manufacturers’ products. Further study is needed
to understand how the presence of loyal consumers affect the integration-
delegation tradeoff.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We first derive the payoffs for both manufacturers in
Table 1. Following this, we then characterize the conditions under which a
manufacturer will not advertise regardless of whether its rival advertises.
1) Deriving the manufacturers’ payoffs in Table 1.
For ease of exposition, let us use V1(V2) to denote the common valuation a
switcher obtains from product 1(2); for example, if manufacturer 1 advertises
and manufacturer 2 does not, we have V1 = V + , and V2 = V. Recall that
while determining the prices, each manufacturer intends to extract revenue
from the switchers and its corresponding turf. Moreover, under Assump-
tion 1 (V3 < V < V4, where V3, V4 is defined below), for any given pair
(p1, p2), the marginal consumer in the competitive market would be x =
t + (V1 − V2) + p2 − p1
2t
(from V1 − tx − p1 = V2 − t(1 − x) − p2). Likewise,
when Vi − γ t − pi > 0, the marginal consumer in the turf of M1(M2) is x1 = 1
(x2 = 0), which means that all loyal consumers are served in equilibrium.
We derived the equilibrium when all loyal consumers are served. The
effective demand of each product comes from the competitive market and
the corresponding turf. Thus, the equilibrium prices (p∗1, p
∗














∣ s.t. Vi − γ t − pi >0
}
,
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where j = i represents the rival manufacturer and CAi = C if manufacturer i
advertises, and CAi = 0 otherwise. Our strategy is to first ignore the constraint
Vi − γ ta − pi > 0 and characterize the equilibrium prices via the first-order
conditions, and later we discuss the condition when this constraint is satisfied.
The first-order conditions give rise to the equilibrium prices p∗1 = t(1 +
2β) + V1 − V2
3
and p∗2 = t(1 + 2β) +
V2 − V1
3
; the corresponding demands
of M1 and M2 are D1 = 12 +
V1 − V2
6t









t(1 + 2β) + Vi − V j
3
]2
− CAi, j = i.
If no manufacturer advertises (V1 =V2 =V), we have π D1 (N,N)=π D2 (N,N)=
t
2




t (1+2β) + 
3
]2








finally, when both manufacturers advertise, V1 = V2 = V + , and
π D1 (A, A) = π D2 (A, A) =
t
2
(1 + 2β)2 − C.
Let us now check the constraint Vi − γ ta − pi > 0. It is easy to verify
that under the condition V > t(1 + γ + 2β) ≡ V3, Vi − γ t − pi > 0, i = 1, 2 is
satisfied by the above price pair (p∗1,p
∗
2).
2) Deriving the conditions under which the manufacturer does not advertise.
Define F D1 ≡ π D1 (A, N A) − π D1 (N A, N A) + C and F D2 ≡ π D2 (A, A) −
π D2 (A, N A) + C. From the expressions of π D1 (A, N A), π D1 (N A, N A), and














which after some algebra leads to F D1 > F
D
2 . Therefore, if C ≥ F D1 , it is not
beneficial for a manufacturer to advertise, regardless of whether its rival
advertises or not. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 We first derive the payoffs for both manufacturers in
Table 2. Following this, we then characterize the conditions under which a
manufacturer will advertise, regardless of whether its rival advertises, and
advertising makes both manufacturers worse off.
1) Deriving the manufacturers’ payoffs in Table 2.
Let us assume that each switcher obtains a common valuation V1(V2)
from product 1(2). The equilibrium behavior is characterized by backward
induction: We first take the wholesale price pair (w1, w2) as given and derive
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the retailers’ optimal strategies (of the retail prices); we then proceed to char-
acterize the equilibrium wholesale prices for the manufacturers’ competition.
Given the wholesale price pair (w1, w2), each retailer chooses the retail price
to maximize its profit. Let (p1, p2) denote the retail prices chosen by retailers
1 and 2, respectively. When M1 advertises, for V > V3, the marginal consumer
in the competitive market would be located at x = t + V1 − V2 + p2 − p1
2t
(which follows from V1 − tx − p1 = V2 − t(1 − x) − p2). Likewise, if we as-
sume that V and  are small enough (V < V4 and  < min{1,2} , see
the discussions below), the marginal consumers for M1’s and M2’s turfs are
located at x1 = V1 − p1
γ t
and x2 = 1 − V2 − p2
γ t
, respectively; in other words,
the loyal consumers for both manufacturers are not fully served in equilibrium.
Therefore, the equilibrium price pair (p∗1, p
∗






t + Vi − V j + pj − pi
2t
+ β Vi − pi
γ t
)}
, j = i, i, j = 1, 2.
The first-order conditions yield the following prices:
p∗1 =
γ t + 2βV1
γ + 4β +
′γ (γ + 2β) + 2(γ + 2β)2w1 + γ (γ + 2β)w2
(3γ + 4β)(γ + 4β) ,
p∗2 =
γ t + 2βV2
γ + 4β −
′γ (γ + 2β) + 2(γ + 2β)2w2 + γ (γ + 2β)w1
(3γ + 4β)(γ + 4β) ,
where ′ ≡ V1 − V2. Given these equilibrium prices, we obtain that the mar-
ginal consumers in the competitive market and the two turfs as follows:
x∗ = 1
2
+ (V1 − V2)(γ + 2β) + (γ + 2β)(w2 − w1)
2t(3γ + 4β) ,
x∗1 =
V1(γ +2β)(3γ +4β)−γ t(3γ +4β)−′γ (γ +2β)−2(γ +2β)2w1−γ (γ +2β)w2
γ t(3γ +4β)(γ +4β) ,
1−x∗2 =
V2(γ +2β)(3γ +4β)−γ t(3γ +4β)+′γ (γ +2β)−2(γ +2β)2w2−γ (γ +2β)w1
γ t(3γ +4β)(γ +4β) .
Now we return to the manufacturers’ problem. In the wholesale price
competition, M1 and M2 choose w1 and w2 to maximize their own profits:
π I1 = max
w1
{
w1(x∗ + βx∗1) − CA1
}
,
π I2 = max
w2
{
w2[1 − x∗ + β(1 − x∗2)]−CA2
}
,
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where CAi = C if manufacturer i advertises, and CAi = 0 otherwise. Applying
the first-order conditions, we obtain
w∗1 =
(3γ + 4β)(γ t + 2βV1)
γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2 +
′γ (γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2) ,
w∗2 =
(3γ + 4β)(γ t + 2βV2)
γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2 −
′γ (γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2) ,




′(γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
2t(3γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2) ,
x∗1 =
V1(γ + 2β) − γ t
γ t(γ + 4β) −
(γ + 2β)(3γ + 4β)(2V1β + γ t)
γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)
− 4γ
′(γ + 2β)(3γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 6γβ + 6β2)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
γ t(γ + 4β)(3γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2) ,
1 − x∗2 =
V2(γ + 2β) − γ t
γ t(γ + 4β) −
(γ + 2β)(3γ + 4β)(2V2β + γ t)
γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)
+ 4γ
′(γ + 2β)(3γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 6γβ + 6β2)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
γ t(γ + 4β)(3γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2) .
Therefore, if x∗1 < 1 and 0 < 1 − x∗2 < 1 for all possible V1, V2, we get the
effective demands of the manufacturers:
D∗1 =
(γ + 2β)(γ t + 2βV1)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
2γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)
+ 
′(γ + 2β)2(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)(3γ 2 + 16γβ + 8β2)
2t(γ + 4β)(3γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2) ,
D∗2 =
(γ + 2β)(γ t + 2βV2)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
2γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)
− 
′(γ + 2β)2(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)(3γ 2 + 16γβ + 8β2)
2t(γ + 4β)(3γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2) .
In the following we make extensive use of the effective demands D∗1 and
D∗2 to derive the retailers’ equilibrium profits. We again divide our analysis
into three cases, depending on the manufacturers’ advertising strategies: (1)
no manufacturer advertises; (2) only one manufacturer advertises; and (3) both
manufacturers advertise.
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γ 2+14γβ+16β2)−(γ +2β)(3γ +4β)(2βVi)+γ t
γ t(γ +4β)(γ 2+14γβ+16β2) <1, i=1, 2,
for all possible values of V1 and V2. Rearranging the above equations, we




64β3 + 24β2 + 72γβ2 + 24γβ + 18γ 2β + 4γ 2 + γ 3)
(γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2) ≡ V4,
 <
[
1 − 2βV − γ t + γ V
γ t(γ + 4β) +
(γ + 2β)(γ t + 2βV)(3γ + 4β)
γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)
]
× t(γ + 4β)(3γ + 4β)(γ
2 + 14γβ + 16β2)(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2)
4(γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)(γ 2 + 6γβ + 6β2) ≡ 1,
 <
γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)
(γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2) +
(γ t + 2βV)(3γ + 4β)
(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
− (2βV − γ t + γ V)(γ
2 + 14γβ + 16β2)
(γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2) ≡ 2.
In case 1, V1 = V2 = V, and therefore we have
π I1 (N A, N A) = π I2 (N A, N A)
= (γ + 2β)(3γ + 4β)(γ t + 2βV)
2(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
2γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)2 .
In case 2, since only one manufacturer advertises, it is either V1 = V + ,
V2 = V or V1 = V, V2 = V +. Without loss of generality, let us focus on the
case in which manufacturer 1 advertises. In such a scenario, we have
π I1 (A, N) = π I2 (N, A)
= −C +
[
(3γ + 4β)(γ t + 2β(V + ))
γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2
+ γ (γ + 2β)(γ
2 + 8γβ + 8β2)




(γ + 2β)(γ t + 2β(V + ))(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
2γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)
+ (γ +2β)
2(γ 2+8γβ+8β2)(3γ 2+16γβ+8β2)
2t(γ +4β)(3γ +4β)(γ 2+14γβ+16β2)(3γ 2+18γβ+16β2)
]
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and
π I2 (A, N) = π I1 (N, A)
=
[
(3γ + 4β)(γ t + 2βV)
γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2 −





(γ + 2β)(γ t + 2βV)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
2γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)
− (γ + 2β)
2(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)(3γ 2 + 16γβ + 8β2)
2t(γ +4β)(3γ +4β)(γ 2+14γβ+16β2)(3γ 2+18γβ+16β2)
]
.
We next investigate case 3 in which both manufacturers advertise; that is, V1 =
V2 = V + . In this case, we obtain
π I1 (A, A) = π I2 (A, A)
= (γ + 2β)(3γ + 4β)(γ t + 2β(V + ))
2(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)
2γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)2 − C.
2) Deriving the conditions for the manufacturers’ incentive to advertise.
To derive the conditions under which each manufacturer advertises re-
gardless of whether its rival advertises and both manufacturers are worse off
upon advertising, we define the following thresholds: F I1 ≡ π I1 (A, N A) + C −
π I1 (N A, N A), F
I
2 ≡ π I2 (A, A) + C − π I2 (A, N A), and F I3 ≡ π I1 (A, A) + C −
π I1 (N A, N A). Straight forward algebra shows that
F I1(V)=
2(γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)(2Vβ + γ t) × G1(β, γ )
2γ t(γ + 4β)( γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)2(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2)
+ (γ +2β)(γ
2+8γβ+8β2)(γ 4+28γ 3β+156γ 2β2+256γβ3+128β4)×G2(β,γ )2
2γ t(γ +4β)(3γ +4β)( γ 2+14γβ+16β2)2(3γ 2+18γβ+16β2)2 ,
F I2(V)=
4β(γ + 2β)(3γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)(2Vβ + γ t)
2γ t(γ + 4β)( γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)2
+4γ (γ + 2β)
2(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)(γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 6γβ + 4β2)(2Vβ + γ t)
2γ t(γ + 4β)( γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)2(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2)
− γ
2(γ + 2β)3(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)2(3γ 2 + 16γβ + 8β2)2
2γ t(γ + 4β)(3γ + 4β)( γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)2(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2)2
+4β
2(3γ + 4β)(γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)2
2γ t(γ + 4β)( γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)2 ,
F I3(V)=
2(γ + 2β)(3γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)(2Vβ + γ t + β)β
γ t(γ + 4β)(γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)2 ,
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where
G1(β, γ ) = 256β5 + 64β4 + 576γβ4 + 160γβ3 + 456γ 2β3
+ 122γ 2β2 + 146γ 3β2 + 29γ 3β + 15γ 4β + 2γ 4,
G2(β, γ ) = γ (γ + 4β)(3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2)
+ 2β(3γ + 4β)(5γ 2 + 32γβ + 32β2).
Furthermore, it can be verified that F I1 (V) > F
I
2 (V), and F
I




γ (γ + 2β)(γ 2 + 8γβ + 8β2)(3γ 2 + 16γβ + 8β2)




Recalling the definitions of F I1 , F
I
2 , and F
I
3 , we conclude that when F
I
3 < C <
F I2 , each manufacturer advertises regardless of its rival’s advertising strategy
and advertising makes the manufacturers worse off. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 Let us first show that in the absence of the advertising
competition, it is possible that the manufacturers will be better off under the
indirect channels (compared to the direct channels). To this end, it suffices
to identical conditions under which π Ii (N A, N A) > π
D
i (N A, N A), where i =
1, 2. This condition is satisfied when V > V6, where
V6 = t(1 + 2β)(γ




γ (γ + 4β)






Let us now introduce the advertising competition. Recall that the
thresholds are defined as F I1 (V) ≡ π I1 (A, N A) + C − π I1 (N A, N A) , F I2 (V) ≡
π I2 (A, A) + C − π I2 (A, N A), and F I3 (V) ≡ π I1 (A, A) + C − π I1 (N A, N A).
From Proposition 1 and 2, if we define V7 as the solution of F D1 (V) = F D2 (V),9
then it can be derived that F D1 (V) < F
I
2 (V) when V > V7.
Hence, if F D1 (V) < C < F
I
2 (V), the manufacturers do not advertise if both
are selling through the direct channels but attempt to do so when selling
through the indirect channels. Furthermore, from Proposition 2, if F I3 (V) <
C < F I2 (V), both manufacturers intend to advertise under the indirect channels
and would be better off if they could commit not to do so.



















× γ t (γ + 4β)
(
γ 2 + 14γβ + 16β2)2 (3γ 2 + 18γβ + 16β2)
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For ease of exposition, let us define the profit difference:
F(V)≡π I1 (A, A) + C − π D1 (N A, N A)
= (γ +2β)(3γ +4β)(γ
2 + 8γβ + 8β2)(2βV + 2β + γ t)2




When C > F(V), both manufacturers with indirect channels are worse off than
with direct channels.
Furthermore, define V8 and V9 as the two solutions of F I2 (V) = F(V).10 It
can then be derived that F I2 (V) > F(V) when V8 < V < V9.
Recall that we assume V3 < V < V4, which means that under the indirect
channel, the manufacturer does not serve its entire turf; whereas the entire
turf is served under the direct channel (this follows from the proofs of
Propositions 1 and 2). Combining all above conditions, we conclude that
if max{V3, V5, V6, V7, V8} < V < min{V4, V9}, and  is small, there exists a
range of C such that max
{




< C < F I2 . In this case, the manufac-
turers are dragged into a prisoners’ dilemma under the indirect channel but
would not adopt the wasteful advertising if they use direct channels. 	unionsq
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